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Courts frequently stand in ill repute today for their part
in the failure of the administration of criminal justice. All too
often a person generally conceded to be guilty is set free, aided
and abetted, it seems to the layman, by the law itself. It is a
standard criticism of courts that they have failed to adapt their
rules to modem settings. In the field of criminal law this is
particularly true. In the course of a criminal trial if error in-
tervenes which is prejudicial to the defendant, he can have this
corrected by a reviewing court. If similar error occurs, preju-
dicial to the prosecution, and the defendant is acquitted because
of it, no appeal can be had by the prosecution. Knowing this,
the trial court will naturally incline his rulings in favor of the
defendant, for no court wants to incur the danger of reversal.
The prosecuting attorney must move with caution for fear of
making a mistake which will cause a reversal in an appellate
court. The defense attorney is impeded by no such fear.
Considered as an original proposition, in a day when there
seems to be more danger the guilty will escape than that the
innocent will be punished, a rule, which permits a defendant
to have an appellate review but denies it to the state, might
not achieve the following in the courts that this one has. The
rule has been attacked by judges and writers.' The rule seems
to be based on precedent and on reasons having little factual
basis at the present time. Assuming that there is a need of re-
examination of the rule, we shall consider the Ohio law on the
point.
I. MAY THE STATE PROSECUTE ERROR TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT BELOW?
The overwhelming numerical weight of authority in this
country holds that a state has no right to a writ of error after
2 35 Yale Law Journal, 674; 36 Yale Law Journal, 486.
94 LAV JOURNAL
a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case, except
in accordance with express statutes, whether that judgment was
rendered upon verdict of acquittal, or upon determination
by the court of a question of law.2 From this view there is,
however, a dissent holding that the state does have such right
even in the absence of statute.3 Prior to 1912 the majority
rule was followed in Ohio cases holding that the statutes pro-
viding for appellate review in criminal cases did not apply to
review sought by the state.4 Before 1912 all appellate juris-
diction was statutory, but since the adoption of constitutional
amendments in that year, jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
and of the Supreme Court is provided by the constitution so
that the legislature cannot add to, or detract from, it.5
Article IV, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution confers on
the Court of Appeals jurisdiction "... to review, affirm, mod-
ify or reverse the judgments of the Courts of Common Pleas."
It has been held that the Court of Appeals may, under the
power conferred by this section, review all judgments of the
Court of Common Pleas, but the case so holding was not a
criminal one.
There are two Supreme Court cases in Ohio holding by
way of dicta that the state may prosecute error to the Court
of appeals under proper circumstances. In State v. Cameron,"
where a demurrer to an indictment had been sustained by the
trial court and the case was in the Supreme Court on a bill
of exceptions by the prosecuting attorney, the court said at
page 2 19:
We are all agreed that the State might have prosecuted an appeal
in this case for a reversal of the judgment below, there having been no
jeopardy.
In State v. Kassay,8 a case involving similar facts, the court
said at page 18 1 :
It was stated in the opinion in the Cameron case that, in all cases
where the defendant has not been placed in jeopardy, error might be
sxz6 Ohio St., 177 (1932).
7 89 Ohio St., z24 (914).
2 17 C.J. 41i 8 R.C.L. 168.
'State v. Buchanan, 9 Am. Dec., 630 (Md., x82z); CoM. v. McKisson, 11 Am.
Dec., 630 (Penna., 1822); Comm. v. Capp, 48 Penna., 53 (1864); State v. Robinson, 37
La. Ann., 673 (.x885); State v. Lee, 3o AtI., xiio (Conn., 1894).
"State v. Simmons, 49 Ohio St., 305 (z8gz); Mick v. State, 72 OhiO St., 388
(190).
5 Cincinnati Polyclinic v. Balch, 9z Ohio St., (ig*).
6 Ibid.
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prosecuted to the Court of Appeals from a judgment. No error could
have been prosecuted, of course, from a judgment entered after the
defendant was placed in jeopardy . . . We agree that error might have
been prosecuted in this case, since it appears that Kassay had not yet been
placed in jeopardy.
There is dictum in another Supreme Court case, State v.
fWhitmnore,' intimating that this could not be done. There the
court, in considering the constitutionality of the statute pro-
viding for bills of exceptions by the prosecuting attorney di-
rectly to the Supreme Court from the trial court, said at
page 383:
Without the legal machinery provided for in this section (i.e., the
section providing for bills of exception by the prosecuting attorney to
the Supreme Court) the state was powerless to review questions of law
where the accused was discharged from custody upon one of the inter-
locutory pleas or in case of acquittal. The law announced by the trial
court however erroneous and outrageous, in the absence of this statute,
constituted the law of the case, for it was the last word of the court
under such circumstances.
The apparent conflict in these statements seems reconcilable
if the remarks in the Whitmore case are. confined to a situation
in which under the prevailing notion of jeopardy, a person has
been in jeopardy, and the state wants some controverted point
of law settled. In that case unless the statute under considera-
tion in the Whitmore case were valid, the state would be left
remediless for even under the dicta of the Cameron case and
the Kassay case the state could not then file a petition in error
in the Court of Appeals.
This attempted reconcilatiofi draws further strength from
the fact that the judge who wrote the opinion in the Whitmore
case had concurred in the Kassay case, the two being recorded
in the same volume. Had he intended to overrule what was
said in the Kassay case, surely he would have said so. Instead
he said specifically he approved the Cameron case and the Kas-
say case.
There are three reported cases in the Court of Appeals on
the question. In State v. Blair, it was held that the state did
have a right to file a petition in error in the Court of Appeals
seeking a reversal of the judgment when the defendant's de-
murrer to the indictment had been sustained.
9 xz6 Ohio St. 38z (1933).
10 24 Ohio App. 413 (1927).
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In State v. Kondak," the court was considering a petition
in error by the state in a case in which the trial court acting
under authority conferred by statute, had, after the jury found
the defendant guilty of first degree murder, modified the ver-
dict by finding the defendant guilty of second degree murder.
The court held that reading of Article IV, Section 6 of the
Constitution alone would seem to confer jurisdiction on it to
hear the petition in error, but that Article i, Section io, pro-
viding that no person shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the
same offense was a restriction on the first named section, and
that, therefore, the petition in error could not be filed because
a reversal would place the defendant in jeopardy a second time.
In State v. McNary, the defendant had, in the trial court,
demurred to the indictment, and the demurrer was overruled.
The jury was impanelled, and five witnesses had testified for
the state, when the court sustained the defendant's demurrer
to the indictment which had been repeatedly renewed. The
prosecutor filed in the Court of Appeals a petition in error
which the defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction. The court, holding that it had juris-
diction, that the defendant had not been in jeopardy, and that
the indictment was good, reversed the judgment of the Com-
mon Pleas Court. 2
The case was certified to the Supreme Court as being in
conflict with State v. Kondak, sapra. The Supreme Court found
that the indictment was not good, and affirmed the judg-
ment of the Common Pleas Court, expressly leaving open the
question of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to hear the
case. ". Two judges dissented, one holding that the indictment
was good and that the defendant would not be placed twice in
jeopardy by being now tried.'
It would seem from the above cases that the Court of Ap-
peals has in some instances jurisdiction to hear a petition in
error by the state, and that this is limited, under the prevailing
concept of jeopardy, by the provision that no person shall be
"Ohio App., 422, (1933).
x6 Abs., zS, (1934).
'3 McNary vs. State, sz8 Ohio St., 497 (1934).
" It was intimated in State v. Kassay, supra, that the Supreme Court can have no
jurisdiction to pass on the merits of a case arising in the common Pleas Court unless the
case comes to it through the Court of Appeals, and that the Supreme Court has no juris-
diction unless the Court of Appeals has it. If that is true, it is dificult to see how in the
McNary case the Supreme Court could pass on the merits of the indictment without decid-
ing whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to pass on the indictment.
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twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. This leads to a
consideration of jeopardy.
II. WHEN DOES JEOPARDY ATTACH IN OHIO?
Whatever its origin may have been, the doctrine that no
person shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense
is now different from the doctrine of res adjudicata. The latter
does not prevent the correction of errors prejudicial to either
party by a reviewing court. The former does prevent such
correction when the errors are prejudicial to the state. This
double jeopardy doctrine developed from the harsh criminal
law existing in England several centuries ago. Humane judges
fostered many technicalities to mitigate the harshness of the
law. We no longer have any such harsh criminal law. The
reason for the doctrine has ceased, yet the doctrine is firmly
embedded in our thinking about the criminal law. If we should
re-examine the doctrine, we might find considerable merit in
the arguments of Mr. Justice Holmes, expressed in his dis-
senting opinion in Kepner v. U. S.1 He says at page 134:
... Logically and rationally a man cannot be said to be more than
once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be tried. The
jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from its beginning to the end of
the cause. Everybody agrees that the principle in its origin was a rule
forbidding a trial in a new and independent case where a man had been
tried once. But there is no rule that a man may not be tried twice in
the same case. It has been decided by this court that he may be tried a
second time, even for his life, if the jury disagree . . . or, notwithstand-
ing their agreement and verdict, if the verdict is set aside on prisoner's
exceptions for error in trial.
If a statute should give the right to take exceptions to the gov-
ernment, I believe it would be impossible to maintain that the prisoner
would be protected by the constitution from being tried again. He no
more would be put in jeopardy a second time when retried because of
a mistake in law in his favor, than he would when retried for a mistake
that did him harm.
That line of thought would make the double jeopardy doc-
trine approximate the doctrine of res adjudicata in non-criminal
actions. Such a thing might effect a much needed reform in
the criminal law, but the old notion of what constitutes double
jeopardy is too deeply embedded in the legal thought of the
is 195 U.S., Ioo (1904).
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country to expect a very immediate change. If there is any
change, it will probably be gradual.
The general rule is that a person is in legal jeopardy when
he is put on trial after proper arraignment and plea, before a
court of competent jurisdiction on an indictment or information
which is legally sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction, and a legally constituted jury has been charged with
his deliverance. And he cannot thereafter be placed in jeop-
ardy again." There are many exceptions to this rule. Where
the defendant has consented to the discharge of the jury; or
has been guilty of such fraud in respect to the conduct of the
trial that he was in no real peril; or where the illness of the
judge or the prisoner, or the ending of the term before verdict,
or the inability of the jury to agree requires the discharge of
the jury, the defendant may be subjected to another trial.'
It is submitted that even under the present Ohio law as to
jeopardy, the defendant was not in jeopardy in either the Mc-
Nary case or the Kondak case. In the McNary case the trial
did not continue and the jury was discharged because the de-
fendant had demurred to the indictment. He may reasonably
be said to have consented to the discharge of the jury. In the
Kondak case the defendant moved for a new trial after the
jury had found him guilty of first degree murder. Instead of
granting the new trial the court modified the verdict by finding
him guilty of second degree murder. The defendant did not
get all he asked for in the motion for new trial. Had he got
all he asked, i.e., a new trial, he could not have pleaded double
jeopardy as a bar to this trial. It does not seem that he should
be in a better position to plead double jeopardy when he got
less than he asked for. It seems reasonable that if the Court
of Appeals had found the trial court in error in modifying the
verdict, the verdict could be reinstated, and that this would not
impose a double jeopardy on the defendant.
III. MAY THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY FILE A BILL OF
EXCEPTIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT DIRECTLY
FROM THE TRIAL COURT?
A dicussion of Section 13446-4, General Code, fits log-
ically into any consideration of the criminal review allowed in
26 iz Ohio Jur., 196; 8 R.C.L., 138.
17 State v. Mitchell, 42 Ohio St., 383 (1884).
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Ohio at the instance of the state. The predecessor of this
statute was passed in 1869. It provided that the prosecuting
attorney or attorney general might except to a decision of the
trial court, and, with the consent of the Supreme Court, might
file in that court a bill of exceptions for the purpose of getting
an authoritative decision on a questioned point of law. If the
consent of the Supreme Court was obtained, counsel opposing
the bill of exceptions would be appointed by, and would rep-
resent, the trial court. The defendant would not be represented
since a reversal would not affect his rights, the proceeding being
merely to secure an authoritative declaration of the law.
The validity of this statute was not questioned until after
the adoption of the constitutional amendments of 1912. In a
case arising before 1912, but decided in 19 13, the court found
it necessary to call the power conferred by this statute an exer-
cise of the appellate judicial power of the court.7 8 In the first
case arising after 19 12, the validity of the statute was attacked.
It was contended that since the constitution now conferred
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, this statute attempting to
do the same thing was invalid. The court held, however, that
this was not repugnant to the constitution, but rather in accord
with it, that it did not confer appellate jurisdiction, but rather
provided for appellate procedure."
In 1929 the statute was repealed and reenacted under an-
other section number, providing in addition that the decision
of the court would affect the judgment below when a demurrer,
motion to quash, a plea in abatement, or a motion in arrest
of judgment was passed on."0 This amended statute has been
considered in State v. Kassay,"1 State v. Whitmore," and State
v. Ponticos.2 ' In the Kassay case it was held that the amended
part of the statute was invalid as conferring jurisdiction on the
court. But two judges thought that part was separable from
the old re-enacted part, which they held to be valid, and, under
the provision of Article IV, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution,
requiring the concurrence of all but one of the judges to declare
a law constitutional, the statute was held constitutional. It was
said in the majority opinion that a non-judicial duty was con-
' State v. Cox, 87 Ohio St., 313 (1913).
x State v. Cameron, supra, note 7-
"0 I 3 Ohio Laws, 193.
2' See note S.
22 See note 9.
' 1z6 Ohio St., 431 (1933).
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ferred on the court similar to the duty to determine election
contests and to advise the attorney general in. the enforcement
of charitable trusts, which duties had been conferred by the
legislature and accepted by the court without question. In the
Whitmore case, two judges alone upheld the validity of the
statute, the remaining five thinking it invalid. In the Ponticos
case it was said that a majority of the court thought the statute
invalid, but not the necessary six. Whether the members of
the court who thought the statute invalid thought the new part
alone was invalid, but that it could not be separated from the
valid part, or whether they thought the whole of the law was
invalid, is not reported. It seems, however, that the fact that
the re-enacted part was the law for over half a century is con-
vincing evidence that the legislature would have passed the
valid part without the invalid. If these members think the
whole of the law is unconstitutional as conferring appellate
jurisdiction on the court, it would seem that the answer given
in the Kassay case is adequate. The court performs other non-
judicial functions. Let this be one of them."4
The validity of the statute still remains in question due to
changes in the personnel of the court. Of the present court
only one judge is on record as thinking the statute valid,
whereas three are on record as thinking it invalid. '
That there is nothing to be done after the decision is ren-
dered should not be important. The federal courts have in
cases of great public importance rendered decisions in cases after
the controversy between the parties was stopped. The validity
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was determined after the par-
ticular combination involved in the suit had dissolved." The
validity of a public utility rate ordinance was determined after
the effective period of the ordinance had passed." Many states
have declaratory judgment statutes the validity of which has
been sustained.2"
2" If this statute is held invalid because it deprives the Court of Appeals of juris-
diction, it would be possible under the constitution for the courts to hold that the Court
of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all criminal judgment and that the inhibitions of
the provision against double jeopardy, whatever they may be, apply only to a retrial, and
not to a review of the law involved in the case. Hence a declaration of the law could
ultimately be obtained from the Supreme Court via the Court of Appeals, though the
defendant might not be retried.
= U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., z66 U.S., 290 (1897).
2 5 Boise City Irrigation and Land Co. v. Clark, 131 Fed. Rep., 415 (1904).
1 fBorchard, Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments, 3 Columbia Law Re-
view, 561.
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The statute furnishes a quick and convenient method of
getting an authoritative determination of the criminal law of
the state which might otherwise remain in question for years
with the result that the administration of justice might be con-
siderably hampered. It is not unduly burdensome on the court,
because the court is authorized to retain and pass upon the bill
in its discretion.
If the notion of what constituted jeopardy contended for
by Mr. Justice Holmes, supra, were adopted there would be
little necessity for such a statute, but since we cannot reasonably
expect that view to prevail for some time, this statute can still
be of some assistance to the state in the administration of crim-
inal law, if its validity is upheld.
